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Austra l ia -China c lashes in  the 
COVID-19 era: Adjusting to a “new 
normal” in bilateral relations?
Dr Thomas S. Wilkins
The COVID-19 Pandemic: A critical juncture in the Indo 
Pacific geopolitical landscape
The spread of the novel Corona Virus COVID-19 from the Chinese 
province of Hebei across the world has resulted in a global pandemic 
of catastrophic proportions. Certain countries have been affected 
more severely than others, and there have been glaring disparities 
in how national governments have responded to the outbreak. 
In addition to the global death toll of 400,000 (and counting), the 
industrial and financial disruption has been severe, with the Asian 
Development Bank estimating the loss to the global economy at 
between USD$ 5.8-8.8 trillion.1 To overcome the current crisis, 
and work toward a vaccine, global solidarity, including cooperation 
through multilateral organizations like the World Heath Organization 
(WHO), is desperately needed.
And yet, the immediate focus on taming the COVID-19 pandemic 
has not entirely obviated the time-honoured practice of Realpolitk 
(“power politics”). Putting aside the pressing need to cooperate 
internationally to defeat the pandemic, it has not taken long for 
nationalist tendencies to emerge in the midst of the crisis, leading to 
a “propaganda war.” The United States and the Peoples Republic of 
China (PRC) have both resorted to (sometimes absurd) accusations 
relating to the alleged “man-made” provenance of the virus, and 
these have stoked nationalist sentiment among populations already 
suf fering from deaths/illness, social isolation, economic losses, 
and the prospect of a bleaker future due to COVID-19. Indeed, it 
would appear the magnitude and multidimensionality of the COVID 
crisis has only served to bring many simmering geopolitical and 
geoeconomic tensions to a head. Even during the height of the 
1　Asian Development Bank, ‘Updated Assessment of the Potential Economic 
Impact of COVID-19’, May 2020, https://www.adb.org/publications/updated-
assessment-economic-impact-covid-19
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outbreak in Wuhan, and now after its apparent 
recovery, the PRC has maintained and even 
increased pressures on Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
in other territorial disputes, such as the South 
China Sea (SCS). As Prof. Aaron Friedberg 
of Princeton University observes - ‘Beijing’s 
behavior has marked a continuation and, in 
certain respects, an intensification of trends 
visible before the crisis began.’2
President of the National Bureau for Asian 
Research (NBR), Kenneth Pyle, concurs that 
COVID-19 
‘has acted as a kind of catalyst speeding up 
and intensifying the other motive forces 
that predated it. By distracting and further 
dividing nations, the pandemic has made 
cooperation more difficult. The cumulative 
effect is to create an epochal time of crisis 
and looming danger.’3
Whilst Peter Jennings, Director of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 
attests that
‘COVID-19 has fur ther accelerated 
strategic change, made the challenges of 
dealing with a more assertive China more 
immediate and difficult, highlighted the 
inadequacies of the Trump administration 
and deepened worries about US capacity 
and intent to under write Indo-Pacific 
Security.’4
In the COVID-era we are likely to see the 
2　Aaron Friedberg, ‘A Clarifying Moment: The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Future of the U.S.-China Rivalry’, The New 
Normal in Asia Series, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 29 May 2020, pp. 2-3.
3　Kenneth Pyle, ‘Profound Forces: The Pandemic as Catalyst’, The New Normal in Asia Series, The National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 21 May 2020, p. 1.
4　Peter Jennings, ‘National security strategy can help us build key alliances to counter China’, The Australian, 2 May 
2020, p. 15.
5　Jagannath Panda, ‘PacNet #19 ‒ Five Reasons Why Xi’s ‘Peking Model’ Will Struggle Post-Covid-19’, Pacific Forum, 
7 April 2020.
6　Keith B. Richburg, ‘Covid-19 will permanently alter China’s relations with the world’, The Strategist , Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 24 Apr 2020.
cleavages between China and “the West” in 
par ticular, widen, and tensions increase. As 
the originating state of the pandemic, the 
gover nment of China bears an awesome 
responsibility. This natural predicament is 
exacerbated by revelations that the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) initial response to 
the national outbreak left much to be desired. 
This has led to unwelcome scrutiny of China’s 
communist political system by the world at 
large. In this context Jagannath Panda of 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
(IDSA) argues ‘China will find it hard to dismiss 
the notion that the Covid-19 has revealed a poor 
governance structure that puts the entire world 
in danger.’5 Yet so far, despite the CCP’s attempts 
to spin an ex post facto narrative of charity and 
assistance through the provision of (sometimes 
faulty) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to 
afflicted countries - so-called “mask diplomacy”- 
Beijing has vehemently attempted to deflect 
questions of accountability for the outbreak. 
But, according to Keith Richburg from the 
University of Hong Kong ‘around the world, this 
narrative is being met with derision and outright 
hostility.’6
While a guarded posture is quite predictable 
and understandable on the part of the Chinese 
government, such a stonewalling approach is 
extremely unlikely to satisfy states that have 
suffered so severely from the pandemic. The 
CCP simply cannot admit to its own people or 
the international community any failings in 
its governance, however apparent, or it risks 







Richard Maude, of the Asia Society Policy 
Institute claims ‘The net ef fect of Beijing’s 
handling of the pandemic will be a fur ther 
corrosion of trust in China in the United States, 
Australia, Europe and parts of Asia.’7 Moreover, 
populations and politicians enraged by the 
suf fering caused to their own countries are 
hardly likely to assist with the CCP’s desire 
to play down its culpability. As Ralph Cossa, 
President of the Pacific Forum Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
argues, ‘with China’s failings more evident and 
with the pandemic hitting the US so badly, the 
political class will focus even more on China 
and in particular the administration will want 
to blame China.’8 The ongoing fallout form the 
COVID-19 crisis is therefore accompanied by 
further increases in the strategic mistrust that 
has been building between China and the West 
over recent years. 
Australia: caught in the crossfire
The Australian case brings into sharp relief 
the various dilemmas faced by Western states 
in their bilateral relations with China in the 
COVID era. As a middle power country with 
a high degree of economic interdependence 
with China, and a committed US ally, used to 
forthrightly articulating its national interests 
and values in its diplomacy, Australia finds itself 
in an uncomfor table predicament. Bilateral 
relations with the PRC, already testy, have 
deteriorated further during the COVID crisis, 
with Australian calls for an independent inquiry 
into the outbreak in Wuhan triggering a cascade 
of diplomatic censure and retaliatory measures 
from Beijing. As a result, according to Ashley 
7　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
8　Ralph Cossa, ‘Perspectives: US-China ties going backwards’, Insights, Asialink: The University of Melbourne, 8 May 
2020.
9　Ashley Townshend, ‘China’s pandemic-fueled standoff with Australia’, War on the Rocks, 20 May 2020.
10　Michelle Grattan, ‘View from The Hill: Yes, we’re too dependent on China, but changing that is easier said than 
done’, The Conversation, 1 May 2020.
11　John Garnaut, ‘Australia’s China reset’, The Monthly, August 2018.
12　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
Townsend, ‘Australia is the new frontline for 
China’s use of disinformation and economic 
coercion amidst COVID-19.9
There are at least four intersecting aspects 
to the diplomatic imbroglio with China in which 
Canberra now finds itself. These include (i) 
diplomatic dissonance; (ii) economic coercion; 
(iii) conflicting values and interests; and (iv) 
risks to national sovereignty.
(i) Diplomatic dissonance:
The experience of Australia during the 
COVID crisis is in many ways indicative of the 
increasing diplomatic challenges states face 
in dealing with an assertive China set against 
the backdrop of heightened regional tensions 
and sharpening Sino-American rivalr y. As 
Michelle Gratton, Professorial Fellow at the 
University of Canberra, attests ‘COVID-19 has 
simply brought to the sur face, in dramatic 
fashion, the deep and long-term bind Australia 
is in.’10 Despite a short-lived attempt to “reset” 
Australian-China relations under former Prime 
Minster Turnbull in 2017, the COVID-19 crisis 
has brought tensions once again to boiling point 
between the two countries.11 Canberra’s initial 
call for an independent external investigation 
into the origin of the outbreak in Wuhan and 
reform of the WHO were met with apoplexy 
by the Chinese Government. In a masterly 
understatement, Maude records that ‘China’s 
sharp response to Australia’s call for an inquiry 
into the origins of the pandemic has again 
raised tensions in a bilateral relationship 
already loaded with disagreements.’12 For some 





diplomatic invective, with Chinese state media 
likening the country to “chewing gum stuck to 
the bottom of China’s shoe.”13 Claiming that the 
call for an inquiry was a “political manoeuvre” 
(at the behest of the United States), the Chinese 
Ambassador to Australia,  Cheng Jingye, 
threatened boycotts of Australian education, 
tourism, wine and agricultural products.14 
Seeking to calm the tense situation, Australian 
Trade Minister Simon Birmingham declined to 
“engage in cheap politicking over an issue as 
important as Covid-19”.15 Such attempts to de-
escalate tensions have so far proved in vain.
The issue was finally resolved when the 
World Health Assembly (WHA) brokered an 
EU proposal for a less intrusive investigation to 
be held at some unspecified future time.16 Both 
sides claimed they had been vindicated, though 
the Chinese state-run Global Times continued 
to castigate Australia, declaring that ‘This is a 
slap to the face to countries like Australia - the 
most active player in pushing for ward a so-
called independent probe into China over the 
coronavirus outbreak, which was then rejected 
by the international community.’17 Indeed, the 
offensive-defensive pattern of China’s diplomacy 
has received increasing attention among the 
victims of such “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” as 
it has been dubbed by pundits. (This refers 
13　Lily Kuo, ‘Australia called “gum stuck to China’s shoe” by state media in coronavirus investigation stoush’, The 
Guardian, 28 Apr 2020.
14　Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Transcript of Chinese Ambassador 
Cheng Jingye’s interview with Australian Financial Review political correspondent Andrew Tillett’, 27 April 2020.
15　Daniel Hurst, ‘Australia hits back at “provocative” and “cheap” Chinese embassy comments on Covid-19 inquiry’, 
The Guardian, 19 May 2020.
16　Ben Doherty, ‘World Health Assembly: what is it, and what is the coronavirus inquiry proposal?’, The Guardian, 18 
May 2020.
17　Eryk Bagshaw, ‘No longer a joke: Why Australia’s COVID-19 inquiry campaign won the day’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 20 May 2020.
18　Kyoko Kuwahara, ‘China’s “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”: The Limitations and Challenges Exposed by the Corona 
Crisis’, JIIA Strategic Comments, 16 May 2020.
19　Graeme Dobell, ‘Turnbull memoir lays out Australia’s shift on China’, The Strategist , Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, 11 May 2020.
20　Nick Wiggins and Sasha Fegan, ‘Chinese ambassador’s coronavirus inquiry warning was “reckless, undiplomatic”, 
Alexander Downer says’, ABC Radio National, 30 April 2020.
21　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
to a series of over-the-top Chinese nationalist 
entertainment films, that few in the West have 
ever heard of, still less actually seen).18 Wolf 
Warrior diplomacy does however dramatize the 
assertive actions and belligerent rhetoric of the 
rising power, especially during the COVID crisis. 
The best-selling memoirs of former Australian 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, A Bigger 
Picture, make repeated reference to Beijing’s 
“bullying tactics” for example.19 While Australia’s 
former Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, 
said of Ambassador Cheng: “Not since the days 
of the cold war have I seen an ambassador 
behave in such a reckless, undiplomatic way.”20 
In sum, ‘The fight over Australia’s inquir y 
proposal is emblematic of the immense difficulty 
of managing relations with China,’ according to 
Maude.21
(ii) Economic coercion:
As just indicated, Beijing’s indignation at 
Australia’s call for an international enquir y 
then shif ted to economic retal iat ion,  as 
the Ambassador had explicitly threatened. 
Australian policy-makers have long worried 
about the country’s heavy dependence on the 
Chinese economy for exports of minerals and 
foodstuffs, combined with significant incoming 







economic exposure, it has been feared, leaves 
Australia open to economic punishment if it 
diverges from, or diplomatically confronts, any 
aspect of Chinese policy. These warnings were 
realised with the unveiling of punitive tariffs on 
Australian barley, and various non-tariff obstacles 
implemented against the import of Australian 
beef, coal and iron ore.22 It is standard practice 
that such deliberate retaliatory sanctions against 
countries that displease China (for example the 
suspension of rare earth exports to Japan during 
the 2010 Senkaku crisis), are never advertised 
as such; a fact helped by the target country’s 
frequent compliance with the pretence as they 
scramble to limit the political or economic 
fallout. As Peter Hartcher of the Sydney Morning 
Herald notes
‘In public, the government is careful to 
play along with China’s pretence – its 
trade complaints against Australia are 
based purely on trade technicalities. But 
every member of the government knows 
full well that this is not about trade. This 
is about the Chinese Communist Party 
trying to bully Australia into submission’23
This is disputed by some commentators, 
such as Professor James Laurenceson from the 
Australia-China- Relations Institute (ACRI), who 
argues that there is no direct linkage between 
trade disputes and diplomatic ones (despite 
Chinese representatives explicitly making such 
a linkage this time around).24
Notwithstanding, the economic leverage 
that China enjoys over Australia, and so many 
other trading partners, has been increasingly 
22　Australian Associated Press, ‘Deputy PM “very concerned” over reports China’s power plants warned not to buy 
Australian coal’, The Guardian, 22 May 2020.
23　Peter Hartcher, ‘China can’t bully us into submission: the PM has Australians’ backing’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 May 2020.
24　James Laurenceson, ‘The Trade Dispute between Australia and China should be taken with a Grain of Barley’, ACRI 
Opinion, Australia-China Relations Institute, 5 June 2020.
25　Zhang Han, ‘China’s travel warning a result of Australian animosity, rocky bilateral ties’, Global Times, 7 June 
2020. 
deployed as a form of “sharp power” designed 
to influence government policies in a way 
favourable to Chinese interests, and serve to 
chastise those that run against them. Since 
Australia has economically benefitted from the 
trading par tnership and continues to do so, 
no politician or diplomat can afford to ignore 
the possibility that Beijing will use this lever. 
Regardless of the veracity or severity of the 
trade disruptions actually qualifying explicitly 
or implicitly as “punishment,” this possibility 
has a deep psychological impact on Australian 
behavior, as intended by its instigators. At the 
time of writing, the PRC has slapped a ban on 
travel by Chinese citizens to Australia, ostensibly 
due to the risk of theme being subjected to 
racist attacks. Since international travel between 
the two counties is suspended at this time due 
to COVID-19 restrictions, this action is rather a 
highly symbolic warning designed to unnerve 
Australian businesses and tertiary education 
sector. With the announcement, the Global 
Times crowed that: ‘Australia should have 
considered the costs when introducing anti-
China policies earlier,’ citing offenses such as 
‘smearing China over the COVID-19 pandemic 
and spats over 5G and foreign investment 
issues,’ and closely collaborating with the US in 
its ‘anti-China strategy.’25
And yet, even as Beijing nakedly employs 
economic leverage to chastise Australia for 
its policy choices, indications emerge of its 
diminishing potency going forward. First, the 
conspicuous linking of unfriendly policy actions 
on Beijing’s par t to Australian diplomatic 
choices expose the mutual fiction that economic 





unconnected coincidence. The end of this 
pretence has permitted more robust ripostes 
on the Australian side, with Treasurer Josh 
Frydenberg declaring that “We won’t bow to 
economic coercion [by China]…we will continue 
to talk up in Australia’s national interest and we 
won’t trade off health outcomes for economic 
outcomes.”26 Second, the COVID outbreak 
emanating from China has already caused such 
enormous harm to the Australian economy, 
that threats from Beijing to cause further harm, 
not only appear unbefitting in the context of 
the pandemic, but only serve to tarnish further 
its already damaged reputation. Third, as the 
trade machinations are explicitly confirmed as 
economic coercion, and the overexposure of 
the Australian economy is revealed as a serious 
risk factor in bilateral relations, arguments to 
“decouple” and diversify away from the China 
market are given impetus. Such arguments 
will gain additional traction if the COVID crisis 
marks the end of China’s buoyant economic 
growth and diminishing demand for Australian 
goods and services over time (notwithstanding 
the fact that the PRC remains economically 
dependent on Australia, especially for mineral 
resources). ‘This trend away from China 
towards other markets and suppliers is likely to 
be accentuated as China looks less attractive in 
the wake of the pandemic’ argues Ralph Cossa 
of the Pacific Forum.27 There are increasing 
calls therefore for Australia to wean itself away 
from ‘unhealthy economic dependence’28 on 
a powerful and fractious state ever-willing to 
employ economic coercion and disrupt markets.
(iii) Conflicting values and interests
26　Treasurer of Australia Josh Frydenberg, ‘Interview with Peter Stefanovic, First Edition, Sky News’, 29 April 2020, 
https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/
27　Ralph Cossa, ‘Perspectives: US-China ties going backwards’, Insights, Asialink: The University of Melbourne, 8 May 
2020.
28　Michael Evans, ‘Australian Strategy and the Gathering Storm in Asia’, Quadrant, 14 April 2020, p. 22.
29　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
30　Prime Minister Scott Morrison, ‘Press Conference, Australian Parliament House, ACT’, 15 May 2020, Australian 
Parliament House, Canberra.
The latest drama in Sino-Australian relations 
has also ser ved to expose more clearly the 
fundamental clash of values and interests 
between the two states.  For some t ime, 
Australian policy makers convinced themselves 
that a mutually beneficial trading relationship 
could be quarantined from distinct -or rather 
incompatible - national values and interests. The 
COVID-19 crisis has revealed that this approach 
is now untenable, if it ever was. As Maude points 
out
‘Australia’s headache is not just that China 
has become much more powerful, but also 
that it has become more authoritarian, 
ideological and nationalist under President 
Xi Jinping. China’s foreign and domestic 
policies are conflicting more often with 
Australia’s interests and values. The 
gap between the two countries’ political, 
economic and legal systems is starker 
than ever.’29
Whereas in the past, the clash of values and 
interests could be overlooked or circumvented, 
they are now in more direct collision due to 
the increasing intensity of Chinese interaction 
with the world. In the COVID inquiry imbroglio 
and economic ructions that followed it, Prime 
Minster Scott Morrison, like Fr ydenberg 
above, reiterated the importance of Australia 
cleaving to its “values” and “national interests” 
in recent press conference.30 As a Western 
liberal democratic capitalist country, allied to 
the United States, that emphasises freedom, 
human rights and a rules-based order, finding a 
modus vivendi with an authoritarian communist 







that is now demonstrating its formidable 
economic and now military strength across the 
Indo Pacific, was always going to be a tall order.
More attention has been needed to bridge 
this ideological divide, and learning how to 
manage relations with China has become an 
utmost priority in Australia, with a proliferation 
of think tanks (such as China Matters, the 
Australian Centre on China in the World and 
Australia-China Relations Institute) dedicated to 
interpreting the middle kingdom for Australians. 
A recent addition is the National Foundation 
for Australia-China Relations, to be housed in 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT). According to its remit
‘The Foundat ion demonstrates  the 
Australian Government’s commitment to 
a mutually respectful relationship with 
China, one that is shaped by a strong 
sense of Australia’s values and national 
interests, as well as mutual benefit.’31
These efforts are commendable, even if the 
dividends do not appear obvious at this present 
juncture, but among strategic analysts there 
remains an uneasiness as to how Australia with 
its antithetical values and interests will find 
an appropriate place in a potentially Chinese-
dominated future world order. As Prof. Michael 
Wesley of the University of Melbourne argues 
‘For all of its talk of “shared destiny,” nothing 
about contemporar y China gives cause for 
confidence that a Beijing-centred regional 
order will be sympathetic to our values or 
interests.’32 Even as the Australian government 
attempts to obfuscate and finesse the bilateral 
31　Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘National Foundation for Australia-China 
Relations’, https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/foundations-councils-institutes/
32　Michael Wesley, ‘Reimagining Australia’s place in a new world order’, The Australian, 17 February 2018.
33　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
34　Peter Varghese, ‘Australian universities and China: we need clear-eyed engagement’, The Strategist, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 23 August 2019.
35　Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the contest for the world’s pivotal region (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2020), p. 244.
relationship – euphemistically dubbed since 
2014 a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ 
-  despite the absence of any meaningful 
substance to the title, it must be ever mindful 
of the very real constraints on cooperation. For 
example, Australian sympathies with democratic 
movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong are 
difficult to square with obeisance to Beijing. As 
Maude concludes ‘No Australian government 
can ignore the immense clash of interests 
and values that today’s China creates and the 
limits this inevitably puts on the relationship.’33 
Former diplomat, Peter Varghese claims that 
‘What we need is a clear-eyed engagement with 
China which serves our interests and is faithful 
to our values.’34 With such limited room for 
manoeuvre, this is easier said than done.
(iv) Australian sovereignty at risk?
The somewhat belated realisation that 
their values and interests are for the most 
part incompatible with those of the PRC, as 
brought home to Australians in the course 
of the COVID-19 feud, has further animated 
debates about the necessity of safeguarding 
national sovereignty against both external and 
internal challenges. In principle, Rory Medcalf, 
Head of the National Security College, argues: 
‘nations large and small have a deep-seated 
need to protect their sovereignty – not only their 
territory but their ability to make independent 
decisions in line with their national interests, 
values an identity.’35 Some more hard-line critics 
of the PRC, such as Liberal MP Andrew Hastie, 
Head of Parliament’s Intelligence Committee, 
and other assor ted polit icians/strategic 





“wolverines” to distinguish their robust stance 
towards Beijing.36 Together such voices warn 
of the dangers of compromising Australian 
sovereignty. Hartcher cautions that ‘Beijing 
wants greater control over our country as the 
price of doing business.’37 As such, Chinese 
government spokespersons or state-controlled 
media outlets regularly censure Australia for 
pursuing what it calls “wrong” or “incorrect” 
national policies – i.e. those not approved of 
by the CCP, such as the banning of telecom 
giant Huawei from Australia’s 5G network.38 
This has been repeated during the COVID 
crisis, with Geng Shuang from the PRC Foreign 
Ministry claiming that the ‘Australian side’s 
erroneous words and deeds recently have upset 
the Chinese people and that they may impact 
bilateral relations.’39 Economic reprisals soon 
followed, as indicated above.
Protests that Australia is a sovereign nation, 
so often made by China itself, are of little avail. 
‘Nor does Beijing accept that Australia has 
genuine concerns about some Chinese policies 
and behaviours,’ Maude claims, and: ‘China’s 
inflexible position is that all problems in the 
bilateral relationship are Australia’s fault.’40 
This, many commentators contend, is due to 
imperfect understanding of China, rather than 
genuine disagreement. Yet, in the midst of the 
COVID-19 crisis a number of incidents occurred 
that troubled the Australian public. For example, 
China continued to permit incoming flights to 
Australia from Wuhan even after it imposed 
36　James Curran, ‘China challenge needs clever diplomacy not shrill crusades’, Financial Review, 21 January 2020.
37　Peter Harcher, ‘Red Flag: Waking up to China’s Challenge’, Quarterly Essay, no. 76 (2019), p. 68.
38　Lee Chyen Yee and Meg Shen, ‘China says Australia has made ‘wrong decision’ after Huawei ban’, Reuters, 23 
August 2018.
39　Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson's Remarks’, 29 April 2020. 
40　Richard Maude, ‘Looking Ahead: Australia and China After the Pandemic’, Asia Society, 13 May 2020.
41　Kate McClymont, ‘Second developer flew 82 tonnes of medical supplies to China’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 
March 2020.
42　John Garnaut, ‘How China Interferes in Australia and How Democracies Can Push Back’, Foreign Affairs, 9 March 
2018.
43　The Australian, ‘Editorial: University of Queensland emulates China on dissent in Drew Pavlou case’, The Australian, 
7 May 2020.
internal restrictions on domestic movement due 
to the outbreak. Yet, when Canberra belatedly 
moved to ban such connections, it was accused 
of “racism” (a frequently played card in the 
PRC diplomatic repertoire). In addition, before 
the virus was recognised as a global pandemic, 
a Chinese proper ty development business 
in Australia received instructions to buy up 
and export much needed PPE equipment for 
shipment to China, reducing much-needed 
national stocks.41
There is also an internal dimension to the 
“sovereignty at risk” debate. The extent of 
Chinese attempts to subver t the domestic 
politics of Australia through influence operations 
have only fuelled negative perceptions of the 
PRC. Rampant cyber-attacks and espionage 
in Australia, attempts to buy-of f politicians, 
growing Chinese ownership of national assets 
including critical infrastructure, have all drawn 
critical attention.42 This has led to calls to 
restore national ownership or otherwise limit 
Chinese control of critical infrastructure, and 
national strategic assets, in an echo of similar 
calls for “decoupling” in the United States. 
The nationalist activities of Mainland Chinese 
students caught in clashes with local and Hong 
Kong pro-democracy advocates on campuses 
has also proved embarrassing for ter tiar y 
institutions nominally committed to the principle 
of freedom of expression.43 Like Australian 
businesses, universities also take pains not 







too are vulnerable to capricious boycotts.44 
Questions also remain as to the desirability of 
research collaborations with Chinese institutions 
aimed at potential law enforcement or military 
applications, as well as the controversial role 
of Confucius Institutes and the United Front 
organisations on campus. Gratton attests that 
‘the over-reliance of many Australian universities 
on Chinese students has been recognised 
for some time. It is now obvious this should 
be rectified.’45 Nevertheless, some scholars, 
such as Iain Henry of the Australian National 
University, cautions against the tendency to 
view every negative interaction with the PRC 
as a threat to Australian sovereignty, and to 
reduce every policy contest to a simple binary 
between resistance and capitulation. In relation 
to the recent trade sanctions, he argues: ‘This 
is economic coercion, but it is not an attack on 
sovereignty.’46 Policy makers must therefore 
discern carefully the risks to sovereignty and 
“pick their fights” accordingly.
Conclusion
The Corona virus pandemic is a colossal 
public health crisis that has severely shaken 
both national  economies and the global 
economy in general. Yet behind the chaos and 
disruption the outbreak has caused to societies, 
existing geopolitical divisions have begun to 
quickly resur face, driven by the nationalist 
sentiment the pandemic has stirred. As argued 
above, the crisis has also exposed the difficulties 
that countries like Australia face in managing 
their fraught relations with the PRC. The 
diplomatic backlash experienced by Canberra 
as a result of its call for an independent inquiry 
44　Peter Varghese, ‘Australian Universities and China’, Speech by Mr Peter Varghese AO, Chancellor of The University 
of Queensland, to the 2018 National Conference on University Governance, 4 October 2018, Adelaide.
45　Michelle Grattan, ‘View from The Hill: Yes, we’re too dependent on China, but changing that is easier said than 
done’, The Conversation, 1 May 2020.
46　Iain Henry, ‘The false dichotomy at the heart of Australia’s China debate’, The Interpreter, 18 May 2020.
47　Aaron Friedberg, ‘A Clarifying Moment: The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Future of the U.S.-China Rivalry’, The New 
Normal in Asia Series, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 29 May 2020, p. 3.
48　Grant Newsham, ‘Last chance for US to counter China’s rise’, Asia Times, 27 May 2020.
into the precise origins of the Wuhan outbreak, 
have put all small and medium sized states 
on notice about the consequences of courting 
Beijing’s displeasure. The CCP’s manipulation 
of Australian economic vulnerabilities combined 
with the leveraging of its internal influence 
assets, make it more and more difficult for the 
country to stand by its national interests and 
values in the service of a truly independent and 
sovereign foreign policy. According to Friedberg 
‘the regime’s arrogance and high-handedness 
have served as a clear warning, especially to 
weaker “middle powers,” of what it would be like 
to live in a world dominated by China.’47
Thus, the COVID crisis has alerted Australian 
decision-makers to the de facto nature of 
interaction with the PRC, and further advertised 
the liabilities of economic overdependence on 
one country. Whether Australia will take away 
the appropriate lessons from the crisis, and 
whether it is willing and able to adjust its policy 
settings to the (post-) COVID era “new normal,” 
remains open to question. Grant Newsham 
Senior Research fellow at the Japan Forum for 
Strategic Studies, is optimistic when he states 
‘One suspects the Australians will stand firm on 
security and sovereignty. But alone, Australia 
isn’t enough to forestall PRC domination of the 
region.’48 His second point serves to reinforce 
growing calls for increased cooperation with 
like-minded partners across the Indo Pacific 
region, with a new priority on relations with 
India and Japan especially, increasingly featuring 
in debates among the strategic commentariat in 
Australia.
